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<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\nJan Gallem\u00ed Alb\u00e1s\u00a0<\/strong>es estudiante del M\u00e1ster en Seguridad Internacional en Sciences Po, en Par\u00eds, donde se especializa en inteligencia y riesgos globales.
Actualmente combina su formaci\u00f3n acad\u00e9mica con su labor como Young European Ambassador y su colaboraci\u00f3n con centros de an\u00e1lisis como Global Affairs and Strategic Studies y el Centro de Pensamiento Naval, centrando su trabajo en cuestiones de seguridad internacional. Se gradu\u00f3 en el doble grado de Relaciones Internacionales e Historia por la Universidad de Navarra, periodo durante el cual ampli\u00f3 su perspectiva internacional con estancias en Strathmore University y la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusal\u00e9n. Ha desarrollado experiencia institucional a trav\u00e9s de pr\u00e1cticas en la Armada, tanto en la Escuela de Guerra Naval como en la Direcci\u00f3n de Asuntos Econ\u00f3micos, as\u00ed como en el medio \u00c1frica Mundi. Adem\u00e1s, ha sido representante juvenil de Kinderenergy ante Naciones Unidas en Nueva York.
Es autor de m\u00e1s de una veintena de art\u00edculos en el \u00e1mbito de las relaciones internacionales.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nIntroduction<\/strong>:<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the roof of the Congreso de los Diputados, there are still holes from the two warning shots fired by Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, who stormed the building with 200 Guardias Civiles shouting \u00ab\u00a1Quieto todo el mundo!\u00bb During the subsequent eighteen hours, the young democracy established in 1978 seemed on the verge of collapse. What made this event possible was not only the audacity of the coup plotters, but also the systemic failure of the state intelligence apparatus to anticipate it. This is the CESID, predecessor of the current CNI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 23-F coup attempt constitutes an extraordinarily rich case study in the history of European intelligence, as it exposes a little-explored paradox: how can an intelligence service fail in its preventive function while demonstrating remarkable reactive capacity once the crisis materialises? This essay argues that the CESID’s performance during 23-F was not simply a case of warning failure, but rather a structurally conditioned duality. One in which institutional blind spots, constraints on political receptivity, and internal infiltration neutralised early warning mechanisms, yet the same organisation recovered sufficient operational coherence to play a decisive role in containing the coup’s success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One of the central dilemmas in intelligence studies is that, given the confidentiality of the information involved, scholarly inquiry necessarily relies on historical cases. In this regard, the present work draws on documentation declassified in February 2026 by Moncloa concerning the coup d’\u00e9tat. Prior to this release, existing studies rested primarily on oral testimonies; the declassified material now affords an unprecedented vantage point on the intelligence dimension of the events. An analytical framework is also offered through the work of authors such as Wohlstetter, Betts, and Wirtz, among others. The essay proceeds in three stages: first, it analyses the cognitive and structural conditions that enabled the strategic surprise; second, it examines the deception mechanisms that operated both outside and within the CESID; and finally, it addresses the institutional response once the threat had materialised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This work aims to present a perspective in which failure and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive but rather capable of coexisting, shaped by an institutional architecture that simultaneously constrains and, under sufficient pressure, proves capable of clarifying itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n
- Strategic Surprise and Political Receptivity<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
To understand the origins of the intelligence failure surrounding 23-F, it is important to note that strategic surprise is not a fortuitous event but the product of political receptivity conditioned by state architecture and the saturation of its sensors[1]<\/sup><\/a>. Scholars such as Wohlstetter, who studied the case of Pearl Harbor, suggest that the problem of warning failure rarely lies in an absence of data, but rather in decision-makers\u2019 inability to process available signals amid dense informational noise[2]<\/sup><\/a>. In the case of 23-F, the initial success of the coup rested on an institutionally self-imposed blindness consistent with what Richard Betts terms \u00aborganisational barriers.\u201d[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The receptivity of the Spanish system in 1981 was from the outset constrained by a structural limitation that functioned as a potentially deliberate blind spot. Document D.72 reveals that \u00abthe CESID’s informational domain excludes the Armed Forces (FAS) from the limits of its sphere of competence.\u00bb[4]<\/sup><\/a> Delegating responsibility for military surveillance meant that civilian command would struggle to receive early warning signals from within the armed forces. As Gabriel Cardona observes, this left the nascent 1978 regime particularly exposed, given that it retained military commanders appointed under Franco[5]<\/sup><\/a>. This limitation severely curtailed the CESID’s ability to monitor the coup from its inception. A coup whose roots lay precisely in military unrest. It is therefore more accurate to characterise this as a failure of inherited political design than as technical negligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Political receptivity was further impaired by the cognitive biases surrounding threat prioritisation. The noise generated by daily crises appears to have drowned out the signals pointing towards a coup attempt. As D.72 indicates, from March 1981 the CESID identified four plausible risks: revolutionism, secessionism, terrorism, and involutionism[6]<\/sup><\/a>. Yet as the system was flashing red in response to ETA’s terrorist offensive, a confirmation bias took hold that led decision-makers to discount indicators of an internal military threat. To illuminate this dynamic through a psychosocial lens, it is useful to invoke what Mark Lowenthal calls \u00abthe fight against the incredible\u201d, the cognitive incapacity to process scenarios that, however plausible, fall outside the range of experienced reality[7]<\/sup><\/a>. This form of analytical saturation meant that critical warning signs were treated as manageable political noise rather than as indicators of an imminent attack. One telling example is the \u00abManifiesto de los 100,\u00bb a collective act of subordination which King Juan Carlos described in D1 as evidence that the military situation was \u00abdelicada y digna de atenci\u00f3n.\u00bb[8]<\/sup><\/a> Despite the CESID detecting widespread unrest within the armed forces, the political sphere preferred to process this data as a disciplinary problem rather than as a constitutional threat[9]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Document D.72 further notes that Spain was in a \u00abperiod of consolidation (which) presents particular vulnerability,\u00bb[10]<\/sup><\/a> attributable not only to the early stage of democratisation but also to adverse economic conditions: \u00aban average annual inflation rate of 15% and an unemployment rate close to 12%.\u00bb[11]<\/sup><\/a> In this context, the CESID prioritised high-frequency threats, above all what it described as \u00aba serious terrorist offensive\u201d[12]<\/sup><\/a>, while treating insurrection as a low-probability risk, in part because of the hermetic nature of the armed forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As Wohlstetter argues, surprise is often the analyst’s reluctant accommodation to ambiguity[13]<\/sup><\/a>. The CESID itself acknowledged that detecting coup preparations was inherently difficult, since \u00abtheir preparations must be carried out in absolute secrecy, as surprise in execution is an essential factor for their success.\u00bb[14]<\/sup><\/a> Under these conditions, the failure of 23-F was not merely a collection failure but a failure to produce what Erik Dahl terms \u00abactionable intelligence\u201d[15]<\/sup><\/a>. For a political leader to act preventively, intelligence must be precise and tactical; the CESID’s warnings were merely strategic and general. Combined with Prime Minister Su\u00e1rez’s complex relations with his own intelligence services[16]<\/sup><\/a>, this gap precluded any effective preventive response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2. The Mechanism: Strategic Deception and Operational Infiltration<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
To analyse more precisely the technical dimension of the early warning failure, it is essential to highlight that the coup’s successful deployment appears to have resulted from a sophisticated deception mechanism operating at two parallel levels: on the one hand, disinformation concerning an alleged delegated authority, and on the other, operational infiltration within the CESID itself[17]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most effective deception manoeuvre was the instrumentalisation of loyalty to the Crown. The coup’s leaders, specifically Generals Armada and Milans del Bosch, exploited what Javier Cercas called \u00abthe womb of the coup\u00bb: the exploitation of a disaffected military environment to disguise betrayal beneath an alleged legitimacy derived from the false endorsement of the head of state. This tactic amounted to a disinformation operation[18]<\/sup><\/a> so effective that it neutralised the critical faculties of the deployed troops[19]<\/sup><\/a>. The declassified documents reveal how several of the officers involved, including General Torres Rojas and Colonel Ib\u00e1\u00f1ez Ingl\u00e9s, categorically stated that they \u00abbelieved they were following the King\u2019s orders\u00bb and acted out of \u00abloyalty and faith toward Generals Milans, Armada, and others\u00bb[20]<\/sup><\/a> This strategy is consistent with the analysis offered by James J. Wirtz, who notes that extremely high-risk plans tend to be dismissed by analysts as \u00abtoo hare-brained to be taken seriously,\u00bb[21]<\/sup><\/a> allowing a conspiracy to advance under the protection of its own apparent implausibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What the declassified documents have revealed anew, however, is the dimension of deception that unfolded within the CESID itself. Internal reports from the Agrupaci\u00f3n Operativa de Misiones Especiales (AOME) indicate that at least six members of the unit had advance knowledge of the events or provided operational support to the conspirators[22]<\/sup><\/a>. This phenomenon illustrates what John Centry identifies as failures of \u00abvulnerability identification\u201d, that is, situations in which an adversary exploits structural gaps within the intelligence apparatus with the aim of neutralising it from within[23]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The internal deception process began several days before the coup. According to D7, early warning signs were ignored: on Friday, 20 February, Captain Garc\u00eda-Almenta telephoned Commander Marquina and instructed him \u201cto remain attentive to upcoming events\u201d[24]<\/sup><\/a> Document D6 then reveals how, on the morning of 23 February, Garc\u00eda-Almenta supplied agents Monge, Sales, and Moya with three vehicles bearing false licence plates and several radio-frequency devices distinct from those habitually used by the CESID, ostensibly for a routine mission[25]<\/sup><\/a>. During the coup itself, these CESID agents were not merely gathering information: Captain G\u00f3mez Iglesias was actively coordinating the assault and issuing instructions to Cabo Monge during the advance of the columns towards Congress[26]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The success of this twofold deception mechanism not only ensured the coup’s execution but also decisively shaped the nature of the institutional response. An intelligence service compromised from within cannot react with the coherence that might otherwise be expected of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
3. The Reaction to the <\/strong>Threat<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the coup’s deception succeeded in neutralising the immediate response, it was in large part because of the prior analytical failure. According to Nassim Taleb\u2019s definition of Black Swan, 23-F could qualify as such insofar as it satisfies all the defining characteristics: an \u201cextremely unlikely event that has three defining characteristics: it is unpredictable, has a major impact […], and can only be explained in hindsight.\u201d[27]<\/sup><\/a> Yet this categorisation should not serve as an epistemological alibi. The unpredictability perceived during an event is typically the product of accumulated structural failures rather than an inherent analytical impossibility[28]<\/sup><\/a>. It is nonetheless important to move beyond the initial chaos and examine events through the lens of crisis management in complex systems. Once the strategic surprise had materialised, the CESID rapidly transformed from a state of analytical blindness into a reactive posture marked by a profound internal fracture[29]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The CESID’s response to the coup attempt can be understood as a Type 2 threat response: the incapacity of decision-makers to act effectively despite intelligence received at the eleventh hour[30]<\/sup><\/a>. D4 registers at \u00ab18:20 Radio news: assault on the Congress\u201d[31]<\/sup><\/a> . This dependence on open sources at a critical moment exemplifies what Michael Herman identifies as the collapse of intelligence as a process: when the analytical production chain fails, the state is reduced to consuming information on equal terms with an ordinary citizen[32]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Following the initial shock, the DDI appears to have recovered the initiative through an accelerated operational redeployment. As D5 records, the CESID \u201crapidly transformed the operational deployment into an effective information deployment\u2026\u201d[33]<\/sup><\/a> This phase illustrates a recurrent paradox in intelligence studies, addressed by Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott in their work on intelligence success and failure. A service that has failed in its preventive function can prove highly effective in damage management, precisely because crisis conditions dissolve the bureaucratic barriers and cognitive biases that had previously obstructed the flow of information[34]<\/sup><\/a>. The DDI assumed a strategic advisory role vis-\u00e0-vis JUJEM and the Royal House, furnishing actionable intelligence in real time. Among the tactical recommendations conveyed by Carlos Ruiz, three were of particular consequence: (1) \u201cThat the military authority assume control and issue a statement through the media\u201d; (2) \u201cThat the area around Parliament be isolated in order to cut off reinforcements\u201d; (3) \u201cPsychological action on the occupants of Parliament using loudspeaker systems.\u201d[35]<\/sup><\/a> A crisis operations centre was established by 19:00[36]<\/sup><\/a>, just forty minutes after the warning failure, and the declaration of Alerta Verde[37]<\/sup><\/a> allowed the state to recover situational awareness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This effort to impose rational structure on chaos sought, in James Wirtz’s terms, to \u00abbridge the gap between intelligence producers and consumers,\u00bb[38]<\/sup><\/a> enabling the intelligence community to directly influence decision-making under the jurisdiction of the Comisi\u00f3n de Subsecretarios[39]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The response was further reinforced by the insertion of two undercover CESID agents into the occupied Congress[40]<\/sup><\/a>. According to D4, these agents performed a dual function: on the one hand, they established direct contact with Tejero, Men\u00e9ndez, and Pardo Zancada, on the other, they produced a human intelligence (HUMINT) assessment that proved vital[41]<\/sup><\/a>. It was through this source that the CESID established that the true nucleus of the conspirators was a small minority, and that most of the Guardia Civil personnel who had followed orders had done so under false pretences[42]<\/sup><\/a>. This reactive HUMINT is the capacity of an intelligence service to insert active, unplanned agents into hostile environments in order to recover information superiority. Its relative success stands in sharp contrast to the prior infiltration of CESID’s own cadres by the conspirators, underscoring the asymmetry between reactive efficiency and preventive failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For several critical hours, however, the AOME’s own analysis shows that the CESID had itself become a source of disinformation, owing to the presence of agency personnel among the coup’s supporters[43]<\/sup><\/a>. When the DDI contacted Captain G\u00f3mez Iglesias to request information on the unfolding situation, his reply, delivered while he was in the field supporting Cabo Monge in Tejero’s column[44]<\/sup><\/a>, was \u00abnegativo.\u00bb[45]<\/sup><\/a> It was not until the HUMINT diagnostic was completed that this vulnerability was identified. This episode precisely illustrates what Rid and Buchanan describe as the \u00abinsider threat as a vector of active disinformation\u00bb: the compromised source not only withholds information but deliberately falsifies it in order to protect the ongoing operation[46]<\/sup><\/a>. What distinguishes this from classical espionage is that the double agent operates in real time, within the crisis cycle itself[47]<\/sup><\/a>, a feature that exponentially amplifies the damage caused[48]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was for this reason that, in order to break the deception mechanism, the CESID recommended the aforementioned psychological operations via loudspeaker, aimed at informing Guardia Civil personnel of the \u201cthe situation in the rest of Spain (where calm prevailed)\u201d[49]<\/sup><\/a>, seeking to dismantle the narrative constructed by the high command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The internal disinformation network reached its peak during the final phase of the siege. The deception mechanism did not confine itself to the activation of the coup attempt but extended into the management of its failure, in an effort to maintain the cohesion of the occupying forces. While the strategic surprise had rested on the fiction of Juan Carlos’s delegated authority, the resolution of the crisis hinged on what the defence submissions in Case 2\/81 (D.12[50]<\/sup><\/a>\/D.22[51]<\/sup><\/a>) termed the \u00abPacto del Cap\u00f3\u00bb a surrender agreement that held out the promise of exoneration. The exploitation of juridical ambiguity thus functioned as a secondary operative deception, designed to neutralise the Guardia Civil personnel who demanded guarantees before laying down their arms[52]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion:<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The intelligence history of 23-F defies simple categorization. It cannot be reduced to a story of incompetence, nor rehabilitated as a story of institutional resilience. What the declassified documents reveal is something more structurally significant: a service whose preventive blindness and reactive effectiveness were two sides of the same coin, produced by the same organizational logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The CESID’s failure to anticipate the coup was not accidental. It was the product of inherited institutional design, a threat hierarchy distorted by ETA’s terrorist offensive, and a political culture that processed military unrest as a disciplinary problem rather than a constitutional threat. When compounded by the internal infiltration of the AOME, the result was not merely an analytical failure but a systemic one; the intelligence apparatus had become, in part, an instrument of the very operation it was supposed to detect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And yet, once the coup materialized, the same institution demonstrated a capacity for rapid reconfiguration that proved consequential. The deployment of undercover agents into the occupied Congress, the establishment of a crisis operations center within forty minutes, and the psychological action campaign targeting the Guardia Civil rank-and-file all contributed to accelerating the coup’s collapse. The crisis, paradoxically, dissolved the bureaucratic and cognitive barriers that had prevented effective warning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This duality carries broader implications for intelligence studies. Democratic transitions, as the Spanish case illustrates, produce particular vulnerabilities: inherited military structures, fragile political trust, and a tendency to subordinate long-term threat assessment to immediate political noise. Understanding how intelligence services navigate, or fail to navigate, this structural tension remains essential, not only as a matter of historical inquiry, but as a live question for any democracy still in the process of consolidating itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The lights were flashing. The signals were there. What 23-F ultimately reveals is that the hardest intelligence problem is not collection, it is the political and institutional willingness to hear what the data is already saying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Declaration on the use of AI:<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The preparation of this work involved the collection and review of primary sources made publicly available through the Moncloa website as of 25 February 2026. In particular, documents issued by the Ministry of Defence were consulted, with those referenced in the bibliography selected as study material. Relevant academic and analytical literature was also reviewed and compiled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After reviewing the materials, a detailed outline of the work and its main arguments was developed. The sources were subsequently organised into two NoteBook folders: one for primary sources and another for secondary literature, facilitating efficient retrieval and cross-referencing of information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Artificial intelligence tools were used as part of the writing process. ChatGPT was employed for the translation of original Spanish-language texts, both from primary sources and academic literature. Additionally, a draft of the work was processed using Claude to improve linguistic clarity and fluency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All arguments and interpretations presented in this work are the author\u2019s own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bibliography: <\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n
- Primary Sources:<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
Casa de S.M. el Rey. (1981). Sucinto relato de los sucesos (Documento 20)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981). Relaci\u00f3n CESID (Direcci\u00f3n) – PREJUJEM (J-2) (Documento 3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981). Resumen de la actuaci\u00f3n de \u00abDDI\u00bb (Documento 4).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981). Actuaci\u00f3n del CESID ante la situaci\u00f3n provocada por los incidentes en el Congreso (Documento 5).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981). Informe sobre la participaci\u00f3n de miembros de la AOME (CESID) en los hechos del 23 de febrero de 1.981 (Documento 6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981, 10 de abril). Informe Interno (CESID) Hechos 23-F (Documento 7).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1982, 19 de abril). Nota informativa sobre la anunciada libertad provisional de algunos procesados en la Causa 2\/81 (Documento 12).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1982, 18 de mayo). Nota informativa: Vista Oral 2\/81 (Documento 22).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981, 9 de marzo). Informe sobre la Amenaza Interior (Documento 72)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
B. Academic Literature <\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ag\u00fcero, F. (1995). Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective<\/em>. Johns Hopkins University Press. https:\/\/www.academia.edu\/102798212\/Soldiers_Civilians_and_Democracy_Post_Franco_Spain_in_Comparative_Perspective<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Castro Berrojo, L. (2015). Tres versiones sobre el golpe del 23-F\u2026 o alguna m\u00e1s. Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contempor<\/em>\u00e1nea<\/em>, (13), 294\u2013307. https:\/\/e-revistas.uc3m.es\/index.php\/HISPNOV\/es\/article\/view\/2400<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cercas, J. (2009). Anatom\u00ed<\/em>a de un instante<\/em>. Mondadori.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Dahl, E. J. (2013). Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Lessons for Decision Makers<\/em>. Georgetown University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
D\u00edaz Fern\u00e1ndez, A. M. (2005). El servicio de inteligencia: un actor pol\u00edtico en la transici\u00f3n espa\u00f1ola. Studia Historica. Historia Contempor<\/em>\u00e1nea<\/em>, (23), 201\u2013219. https:\/\/revistas.usal.es\/uno\/index.php\/0213-2087\/article\/view\/6030\/6051<\/p>\n\n\n\n
D\u00edaz Matey, G. (2017). La esencia de la inteligencia: hacia una correcta relaci\u00f3n entre producci\u00f3n y consumo de inteligencia. Instituto Espa\u00f1ol de Estudios Estrat\u00e9gicos (IEEE), Documento de Opini\u00f3n 52\/2017. https:\/\/www.ieee.es\/Galerias\/fichero\/docs_opinion\/2017\/DIEEEO52-2017_Inteligencia_GustavoMatey.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Gentry, J. A. (2008). Vulnerability Identification: A New Intelligence Function. Intelligence and National Security, 23<\/em>(4).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War<\/em>. Cambridge University Press. https:\/\/api.pageplace.de\/preview\/DT0400.9780511837333_A23680085\/preview-9780511837333_A23680085.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lowenthal, M. M. (1985). The Burdensome Concept of Failure. En A. C. Maurer, M. D. Tunstall, & J. M. Keagle (Eds.), Intelligence: Policy and Process<\/em>. Westview Press. https:\/\/catalogue-bibliotheque.sciencespo.fr\/discovery\/fulldisplay?docid=cdi_erudit_primary_702311ar&context=PC&vid=33USPC_SPO:SPO&lang=en&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&adaptor=Primo Central&tab=Everything&query=any,contains, En A. C. Maurer, M. D. Tunstall, & J. M. Keagle (Eds.), Intelligence: Policy and Process. Westview Press.&offset=0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mu\u00f1oz Bola\u00f1os, R. (2021). El 23-F y los otros golpes de Estado de la transici\u00f3<\/em>n<\/em>. Espasa. https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/349763507_El_23-F_y_los_otros_golpes_de_Estado_de_la_Transicion_Madrid_Espasa_2021#fullTextFileContent<\/p>\n\n\n\n
P\u00e9rez L\u00f3pez, P., & S\u00e1nchez Tapia, S. (2023). Inestabilidad militar tras el 23-F: el Manifiesto de los Cien. Aportes. Revista de Historia Contempor<\/em>\u00e1nea, 38<\/em>(113), 135\u2013168. https:\/\/www.revistaaportes.com\/index.php\/aportes\/article\/view\/792\/421<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rid, T. (2020). Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare<\/em>. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. https:\/\/www.cia.gov\/resources\/csi\/studies-in-intelligence\/volume-64-no-1\/active-measures-the-secret-history-of-disinformation-and-political-warfare\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rodr\u00edguez-Zambrano, H. M., & Rodr\u00edguez-Morales, T. G. (2024). Fallos de inteligencia que arriesgaron la democracia en el siglo XXI: la CIA y el MOSSAD. Perspectivas en Inteligencia, 16<\/em>(25), 115\u2013143. https:\/\/ideas.repec.org\/a\/col\/000555\/021292.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ruiz Miguel, C. (2010). El CESID: Historia de un intento de modernizaci\u00f3n de los servicios de inteligencia espa\u00f1oles. Arbor, 186(709), 121-150 https:\/\/arbor.revistas.csic.es\/index.php\/arbor\/article\/view\/500<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Wirtz, J. J. (2024). \u00abAre Intelligence Failures Still Inevitable?\u00bb. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 37(1), pp. 307-330<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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\n\n\n\n[1]<\/sup><\/a> Dahl, E. J. (2013). \u00abWhy Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway\u00bb. Intelligence and National Security, 28(1), pp. 68-90<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[2]<\/sup><\/a> Wohlstetter, R. (1962). Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford University Press<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[3]<\/sup><\/a> Betts, R. K. (1978). \u00abAnalysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable\u00bb. World Politics, 31(1), pp. 61-89 okings Institution Press<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[4]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 72: Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981, marzo). Informe sobre la amenaza interior, p. 11<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[5]<\/sup><\/a> Cardona, G. (1990). El problema militar en Espa\u00f1a. Madrid: Historia 16<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[6]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 72: Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981, marzo). Informe sobre la amenaza interior, p. 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[7]<\/sup><\/a> Lowenthal, M. (1985). The Burdensome Concept of Failure. Citado en: D\u00edaz Matey, G. (2017). Hacia una correcta relaci\u00f3n entre producci\u00f3n y consumo de inteligencia. Instituto Espa\u00f1ol de Estudios Estrat\u00e9gicos (IEEE), p. 7<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[8]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 1: Casa de S.M. el Rey. (1981, 14 de diciembre). Guion de la reuni\u00f3n de S.M. el Rey con la JUJEM, p. 8<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[9]<\/sup><\/a> P\u00e9rez L\u00f3pez, P., & S\u00e1nchez Tapia, S. (2023). Inestabilidad militar tras el 23-F: el Manifiesto de los Cien. Aportes. Revista de Historia Contempor\u00e1nea, 38(113), 135-168<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[10]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 72: Centro Superior de Informaci\u00f3n de la Defensa. (1981, marzo). Informe sobre la amenaza interior, p. 2<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[11]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 72, op. cit., p. 3<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[12]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 72, op. cit., p. 2<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[13]<\/sup><\/a> Wohlstetter, R. (1962). Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[14]<\/sup><\/a> Documento 72, op. cit., p. 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[15]<\/sup><\/a> Dahl, E. J. (2013). Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Lessons for Decision Makers. Georgetown University Press. Referencia sobre la necesidad de inteligencia t\u00e1ctica para la acci\u00f3n del l\u00edder<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[16]<\/sup><\/a> D\u00edaz Matey, G. (2017). La esencia de la inteligencia: hacia una correcta relaci\u00f3n entre producci\u00f3n y consumo de inteligencia. Instituto Espa\u00f1ol de Estudios Estrat\u00e9gicos (IEEE), p. 18<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[17]<\/sup><\/a> Mu\u00f1oz Bola\u00f1os, R. (2016). \u00abManipulada y culpabilizada\u00bb. La prensa de extrema derecha y la Soluci\u00f3n Armada: Una nueva interpretaci\u00f3n. Studia Historica. Historia Contempor\u00e1nea, 34, 371-401<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[18]<\/sup><\/a> Mart\u00ednez-S\u00e1nchez, J. A. (2022). Una aproximaci\u00f3n psicosocial a las causas de los fallos de inteligencia. Revista Cient\u00edfica General Jos\u00e9 Mar\u00eda C\u00f3rdova, 20(40), 909-926. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.21830\/19006586.977<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[19]<\/sup><\/a> Cercas, J. (2009). Anatom\u00eda de un instante. Barcelona: Mondadori.<\/p>\n\n\n\n