{"id":1669,"date":"2026-09-09T09:11:44","date_gmt":"2026-09-09T09:11:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/?p=1669"},"modified":"2026-09-09T09:11:46","modified_gmt":"2026-09-09T09:11:46","slug":"why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/","title":{"rendered":"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n\n\n
\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
\n


Jan Gallem\u00ed Alb\u00e1s\u00a0<\/strong>es estudiante del M\u00e1ster en Seguridad Internacional en Sciences Po, en Par\u00eds, donde se especializa en inteligencia y riesgos globales.
Actualmente combina su formaci\u00f3n acad\u00e9mica con su labor como Young European Ambassador y su colaboraci\u00f3n con centros de an\u00e1lisis como Global Affairs and Strategic Studies y el Centro de Pensamiento Naval, centrando su trabajo en cuestiones de seguridad internacional. Se gradu\u00f3 en el doble grado de Relaciones Internacionales e Historia por la Universidad de Navarra, periodo durante el cual ampli\u00f3 su perspectiva internacional con estancias en Strathmore University y la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusal\u00e9n. Ha desarrollado experiencia institucional a trav\u00e9s de pr\u00e1cticas en la Armada, tanto en la Escuela de Guerra Naval como en la Direcci\u00f3n de Asuntos Econ\u00f3micos, as\u00ed como en el medio \u00c1frica Mundi. Adem\u00e1s, ha sido representante juvenil de Kinderenergy ante Naciones Unidas en Nueva York.
Es autor de m\u00e1s de una veintena de art\u00edculos en el \u00e1mbito de las relaciones internacionales.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The tragic events of November 13th, 2015 remain etched in the memory of many, recalling the hashtag #PrayforParis that spread across social media. For weeks, further attacks were announced in the media. At that time, the Direction g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la S\u00e9curit\u00e9 int\u00e9rieure (DGSI) was facing a challenge that left it overwhelmed: the agency was unable to process, in real time, the massive volume of data generated by its own operations. Intercepted communications (SIGINT), telephone metadata, social networks (SOCMINT), reports from human sources (HUMINT)\u2026 the DGSI struggled to orchestrate this flow of Big Data on its own. Faced with this operational uncertainty, France made a decision that, a decade later, remains deeply controversial: hiring Palantir Technologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Palantir is an American data analysis company founded in 2003 with investment from the CIA. The name is no coincidence: it derives from the seeing-stones of Tolkien’s novels. This choice becomes clearer in light of the company’s flagship product, Gotham, an intelligence fusion system that integrates heterogeneous sources of information, correlates them using machine learning algorithms, and visualizes them as relational graphs mapping networks of suspects, financial connections, or behavioral patterns. Amid the uncertainty of jihadist terrorism, later compounded by the war in Ukraine and subsequent conflicts, this technology represented an invaluable strategic advantage, which is why it has since become embedded within the DGSI’s apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This relationship, however, is not free of controversy, owing to privacy scandals, parliamentary debates, and a succession of institutional promises to build an equivalent sovereign solution. This weighs heavily given Europe’s aspiration to protect its digital sovereignty and achieve strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Multiple proposals have been put forward to achieve such a sovereign solution, from the Outil de Traitement des Donn\u00e9es H\u00e9t\u00e9rog\u00e8nes (OTDH) to the Artemis.IA platform. Yet, with the recent renewal of the contract with Palantir, it seems that the DGSI still lacks a viable alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This dissertation aims to show that the persistence of this relationship is not a transitional arrangement, but an entrenched structural reality of the French intelligence community. Its thesis is that cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persists not for lack of political will, but because of the consolidation of an infrastructural dependency, in which the integration of private algorithmic logic into the backbone of national security has produced a situation of asymmetric dependence. Within this assemblage, the opportunity costs of disengagement translate into a temporary operational blindness that could produce a heightened vulnerability, particularly with regard to terrorism. For this reason, the immediate effectiveness that Gotham offers in closing the gap between massive data and operational decision-making has systematically prevailed, for the DGSI, over concerns of sovereignty, data control, and accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To demonstrate this thesis, the dissertation follows a deliberately progressive structure at the methodological level, advancing from the sociological to the technological, and from the technological to the doctrinal. The first part establishes the theoretical framework of assemblage theory, recontextualized for security studies, on the basis of which the three sociological tools identified by Hoffman are mobilized. This makes it possible to answer the question: why has the DGSI’s dependence on Palantir become entrenched? From there, the dissertation moves to a more technological and doctrinal level, culminating in the question of why the alternatives have not worked, a question explored through what has been termed the fallacy of innovation. Finally, it asks what this implies, a question addressed through a comparative framework contrasting French doctrine with the American AIM Initiative, thereby revealing differences in strategic culture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taken together, the relevance of this work derives from the fact that the assemblage between Palantir and the DGSI is best understood as a case study within a broader paradigm shift. In the current context, intelligence has shifted from being a characteristic function of the state to one that also depends on infrastructural partners, with uncertainty giving new technologies a key role in responding to major global challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. The Assemblage of Palantir into DGSI<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the perspectives through which the relationship between Palantir and the DGSI can be approached is the sociological framework of public-private intelligence assemblage. This concept, which finds its philosophical roots in Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari, has been recontextualized in Security Studies to describe systems in which the production of knowledge does not derive solely from the state, but from a heterogeneous network of non-state actors, with implications for norm-setting and the development of new technologies 1. Assemblage, then, entails thinking of intelligence not merely as an institutional element, but as a distributed socio-technical system spanning state and corporate actors. As argued by Abrahamsen and Williams, this new paradigm does not necessarily entail state vulnerability per se, but rather a reconfiguration of governance in which the public-private distinction becomes diffuse2 . Consequently, this term captures the fluidity and interdependence characteristic of the relationship with Palantir, in which the American firm acts not as a mere software provider, but as an infrastructural partner that defines the tools and logic through which the French state interprets its own national security 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main element that breaks down the institutional barrier is the Forward-Deployed Engineers (FDEs). Their key difference from an external advisor is that they are physically embedded within DGSI operational units, a \u00abshift from outsourcing to networked co-production [through] embedded engineers.\u00bb 4 As they are embedded within the day-to-day structure, these civilian engineers participate de facto in data orchestration. Applying this to military intelligence on the battlefield or to internal security, Anthony King argues that it implies civilian contractors are being integrated into the kill chain 5. For France, then, its counter-terrorism efforts, also understood through King’s concept of the kill chain (relating to targeting), depend on these private technicians to keep the service’s technological infrastructure operational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also worth noting that the debate on intelligence privatization, especially regarding foreign contractors, tends to oversimplify this phenomenon. According to Damien Van Puyvelde, the terminology of \u00abprivatization\u00bb can be misleading; for this reason, it is more accurate to speak of public-private cooperation and interdependency 6. The DGSI contributes legal legitimacy and access to confidential raw data, while Palantir designs the technological infrastructure (Gotham) that generates the output. This symbiotic model has been described as a form of hybrid rule \u2014 a governance model in which power is distributed. This is relevant because, as F\u00e9lix Tr\u00e9guer argues, \u00abprivatisation is not a challenge to prevailing structures of authority, but is embedded in, and inseparable from, transformations in governance.\u00bb 7 France is thus one of the more notable cases of hybrid sovereignty: the state retains legal legitimacy, while operational capacity relies on Gotham’s private infrastructure to \u00abclose the gap between decisions and data collection.\u00bb 8 On its own, this automation process would be impossible for the state to achieve alone. Cooperation persists because, within this assemblage, the state prefers a diminished but effective autonomy over a full but blind one 9 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1 Ceyhan, A. A. (2026). Big Data & AI for Intelligence: Dynamics that structure intelligence in the AI Era (Session 12). Sciences Po<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2 Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. C. (2010), citado en Tr\u00e9guer, F. (2019). Seeing like Big Tech: Security assemblages and the reconfiguration of state power. En D. Bigo, E. Isin & E. Ruppert (Eds.), Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights. Routledge, p. 147.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3 Ceyhan, A. A. (2026). op. cit., slide 3<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4 Ibid., slide 13<\/p>\n\n\n\n

5 King, A. (2024). Digital Targeting: Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Military Intelligence. Journal of Global Security Studies, 9(2), p. 15.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

6 Puyvelde, D. V., & Oling, P. (2025). Public-private collaboration and the digital transformation of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 40(6), p. 1017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

7 Tr\u00e9guer, F. (2019). Seeing like Big Tech: Security assemblages and the reconfiguration of state power. En D. Bigo, E. Isin & E. Ruppert (Eds.), Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights. Routledge, p. 147.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2019). The AIM Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines, p. iii.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

9 Synth Media. (2025, 14 de diciembre). La DGSI reconduit Palantir : chronique d’une d\u00e9pendance assum\u00e9e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Using Hoffman\u2019s sociological approach to understand the assamblage:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To correctly understand the assemblage relationship between the DGSI and Palantir, it is important to consider that it cannot be reduced to an argument about a lack of political will or technological capability. On the contrary, it is necessary to take into account more intrinsic aspects of the sociology of intelligence communities, as Hoffman et al. do in their article. There, the authors provide three theoretical frameworks that are particularly relevant: epistemic communities, field theory, and knowledge circulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Table extracted from Ceyhan, A. A. (2026) Big Data and AI for Intelligence<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.1. Epistemic communities:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The persistence of the link between the DGSI and Palantir goes beyond a simple contractual relationship; what becomes visible instead is the creation of a transnational epistemic community. This theoretical framework, although employed by Hoffman, was originally developed by Peter Haas, and helps explain how cooperation flows naturally between Silicon Valley engineers and French intelligence officers, even under the sword of Damocles that digital sovereignty represents. In this sense, Haas defines an epistemic community as \u00aba network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.\u00bb 10<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the DGSI-Palantir cooperation, the members who make up this community recognize one another not by citizenship, but by their technical competence in Big Data processing. In this sense, contemporary intelligence has transformed from an activity strictly tied to state institutions into a joint epistemic endeavor 11. As Hoffman et al. state, achieving effective cooperation in this new paradigm, whether national-international or private-public assemblages, requires that \u00abwhat matters is the shared epistemology, knowledge, and a communal professional understanding.\u00bb 12 In other words, technical communication facilitates cooperation across national borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This epistemic community is embodied above all in Palantir’s FDEs, who work on-site in DGSI offices 13 . By integrating private engineers into the heart of French security (the OTDH\/Gotham system), the DGSI has adopted a logic of networked co-production. This creates a dependency that is not only technological, but also cognitive: the French analyst learns to see threats through the categories and visualizations designed by Palantir, what F\u00e9lix Tr\u00e9guer describes as the state’s need to \u00absee like Big Tech\u00bb in order to govern a digitalized world 14.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

10 Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), p. 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

11 Ceyhan, A. A. (2026). Big Data & AI for Intelligence: Dynamics that structure intelligence in the AI Era (Session 12). Sciences Po.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

12 Hoffmann, S., Chalati, N., & Dogan, A. (2022). Rethinking intelligence practices and processes: three sociological concepts for the study of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 1\u201325. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/02684527.2022.2113679<\/p>\n\n\n\n

13 The seer and the seen: Surveying Palantir\u2019s surveillance platform<\/p>\n\n\n\n

14 Seeing like a Big tech<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An important element to consider is the role Hoffman et al. assign to uncertainty as a driver of this epistemic dynamic: \u00abThe influence of epistemic communities on policy decisions increases during moments of uncertainty, when the legitimacy of existing modalities for interpretation and institutionalization is questioned.\u00bb 15 This is particularly relevant if we trace the origins of the DGSI-Palantir relationship: in 2015, the DGSI admitted to being overwhelmed by the volume of data it needed to process. Since then, uncertainty in the geopolitical landscape has only increased, especially after the war in Ukraine in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.2. Field Theory:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the growing relevance of Big Data, the secrecy under which intelligence communities operate has become relative, partly owing to the increasing involvement of the private sector in data processing. As Hoffman et al. state, \u00abthe main capital or ‘currency’ of the intelligence field […] is intelligence-knowledge.\u201d 16 Power is therefore distributed among those with the capacity to produce this knowledge, which now resides in the ability to manage data infrastructure and generate accurate outputs. What does this mean? Intelligence-knowledge is not raw data itself, but rather the product of technological refinement. In this sense, Palantir is a technological partner that has managed to dominate the field not through its software alone, but through its capacity to integrate within the DGSI’s data infrastructure and, as such, it controls the tools for producing this knowledge capital. The so-called Peace Dividend left two decades of underinvestment in the European Technological-Industrial Base (ETIB) 17 . With the French state lacking its own technical arsenal after decades of disinvestment, a phenomenon Bertrand Warusfel describes as an administration \u00abpresque enti\u00e8rement d\u00e9munie en mati\u00e8re technologique\u00bb 18, the DGSI has been forced into a relationship of coopetition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is worth highlighting that Palantir cannot be considered \u00abjust a contractor,\u00bb but rather an \u00abinfrastructural partner\u00bb 19 As an infrastructural partner, Palantir provides the Gotham system on which all DGSI activities operate. This position allows it to exercise epistemic arbitration, which entails exploiting knowledge asymmetries to position its technology as the only viable solution to the terrorist emergency 20 . By accepting this infrastructure, the state also accepts that \u00abit structures the conditions of decision-making\u00bb 21 and shapes how the threat is visualized, since, as has been argued, \u00abPalantir imposes a certain vision of the world.\u00bb 22 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problem, then, is not who owns the data, legally, it remains under French control 23 , but rather the logic of orchestration 24. As St\u00e9phane Le Picard states, sovereignty is lost when the decision-making architecture is not under one’s own control: \u00abLa difficult\u00e9 persistante de l’UE \u00e0 […] ma\u00eetriser le logiciel comme couche d’orchestration et de d\u00e9cision.\u201d25 By delegating the orchestration layer of the data infrastructure to Palantir, the DGSI is, de facto, ceding power over sovereign decision-making. For this reason, failing to renew the contract with Palantir would result in an immediate loss of the technological capital necessary to operate in the field of internal security, thereby confirming a dependency that is, by nature, structural and asymmetrical. 26<\/p>\n\n\n\n

15 Hoffmann, S., Chalati, N., & Dogan, A. (2022). Rethinking intelligence practices and processes: three sociological concepts for the study of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 1\u201325. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/02684527.2022.2113679<\/p>\n\n\n\n

16 Hoffmann, S., Chalati, N., & Dogan, A. (2022). Rethinking intelligence practices and processes: three sociological concepts for the study of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, p. 9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

17 ARTICULO DEFENCE MARKET<\/p>\n\n\n\n

18 Warusfel, B. (2021). Intelligence et droit \u00e0 l’\u00e8re de l’intelligence artificielle. Cahiers de la S\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de la Justice, (50), p. 259.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

19 Ceyhan, A. A. (2026). Big Data & AI for Intelligence: Dynamics that structure intelligence in the AI Era (Session 12). Sciences Po, diapositiva 12.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

20 Obendiek, A. S. (2025). Private Companies in Digital Security: How Private Control over Information and Knowledge Shapes Regulatory Challenges. Journal of Global Security Studies, 10(3), p. 7<\/p>\n\n\n\n

21 Palantir and the Alchemy of Hybrid Power – Nato Defense College Foundation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

22 Compte rendu de r\u00e9union n\u00b0 24 – Commission d’enqu\u00eate sur les d\u00e9pendances structurelles et les vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s syst\u00e9miques dans le secteur du num\u00e9rique et les risques pour l’ind\u00e9pendance de la France – Session 2025 \u2013 2026 – Assembl\u00e9e nationale<\/p>\n\n\n\n

23 Renseignement int\u00e9rieur: la DGSI renouvelle son contrat avec l’entreprise am\u00e9ricaine Palantir – 15\/12\/2025 \u00e0 17:34 – Boursorama<\/p>\n\n\n\n

24 le-picard-2026-revolution-numerique-chambardement-economique.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

25 Le Picard, S. (2026). R\u00e9volution num\u00e9rique, chambardement \u00e9conomique. Politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re, (1), p. 51.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

26 Synth Media. (2025, 14 de diciembre). La DGSI reconduit Palantir : chronique d’une d\u00e9pendance assum\u00e9e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.3. Knowledge circulation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hoffman et al. state that \u00abknowledge is in fact broader than ‘secret information’ and includes tradecraft, technological innovation, procedures, and standards of secrecy and professionalism.\u201d 27<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under this framework, dependency is not simply a matter of computer code, but of the assimilation of a private tradecraft that becomes inherent to the functioning of the state. The knowledge that circulates from Palantir to the DGSI is grounded in professional standards and analytical procedures that heavily shape day-to-day workflows. This means that what matters is not simply how Gotham works, but how agents adapt to a specific methodology of data fusion and Graph View. Data Fusion is the concept used both by Palantir’s competitors and by the DGSI itself to describe one of Gotham’s main features: \u00abassembler, de trier, de relier, d’exploiter des masses d’informations disparates.\u00bb 28 Blueway similarly defines the DGSI’s need to \u00abtraiter un grand volume de donn\u00e9es de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 ce qu’elles soient utilisables.\u00bb Graph View, in turn, refers to the capacity for data correlation aimed at mapping social relations and identifying suspects 29.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main vehicle of this knowledge circulation is the above-mentioned epistemic community of FDEs, who represent the transition from outsourcing to networked co-production 30. They assist with data orchestration and develop custom software in the field 31 . As Anthony King notes, these civilian engineers become fully integrated into the security apparatus’s kill chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This symbiosis, however, generates an epistemic delegation with profound consequences. Palantir’s use of machine learning can entail a high degree of opacity regarding the internal logic through which the model, via its hidden layers, arrives at its outputs. This phenomenon has been termed algorithmic silence: \u00abAI intensifies this not just by opacity, but by epistemic delegation: analysts rely on systems whose internal logic they cannot fully reconstruct.\u00bb 32 uch structural dependency transforms the DGSI into a non-autonomous public actor. For example, in her analysis of DATAWAR, Makki argues that \u00abthe contract signed in 2016 … illustrated a new phenomenon: the non-autonomous public player, dependent on a third party to meet a strategic need.\u00bb 33<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, if Palantir were to leave, its machine learning model would leave with it. This means that if a replacement model were adopted, it would have to relearn everything Palantir’s model had learned and redo ten years of technical and human work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Between Doctrine and Dependency: Strategic Culture and the Failure of Alternatives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.1. Strategic Comparison: The AIM Initiative compared to the French Intelligence Doctrine<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The analysis of the DGSI-Palantir assemblage through Hoffman et al.’s sociological approach helps explain the contractual renewal, but understanding its controversy also requires a doctrinal approach. Ultimately, Palantir is an American company, and French intelligence doctrine, shaped by European influences, contains certain elements that set it apart from its American NATO ally. In this sense, while the AIM Initiative (Augmenting Intelligence using Machines) of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) represents a doctrine of pragmatic, deliberate integration of the private sector, French strategy is characterized by a dialectical tension between a European institutional culture and a mimetic rivalry 34 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

27 Hoffmann, S., Chalati, N., & Dogan, A. (2022). Rethinking intelligence practices and processes: three sociological concepts for the study of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, p. 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

28 La DGSI renouvelle son contrat avec Palantir pour trois ans – OpexNews<\/p>\n\n\n\n

29 Sam Biddle<\/p>\n\n\n\n

30 Ceyhan, A. A. (2026). Big Data & AI for Intelligence: Dynamics that structure intelligence in the AI Era (Session 12). Sciences Po, diapositiva 16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

31 Iliadis, A., & Acker, A. (2022). The seer and the seen: Surveying Palantir\u2019s surveillance platform. The Information Society, 38(5), p. 338.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

32 26 BDAI Week 12 FINAL(class).pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

33 Makki, S. (2025). Holding Corporations Accountable? Data age, warfare and the US leadership in AI for defence. En L. Beaumais et al. (Eds.), Quantifying International Conflicts, Springer, p. 247.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

34 Tr\u00e9guer, F. (2019). Seeing like Big Tech: Security assemblages and the reconfiguration of state power. En D. Bigo, E. Isin & E. Ruppert (Eds.), Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights. Routledge, p. 153.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first point of distinction is a cultural resistance to quantification that is absent from American doctrine. While the AIM Initiative prioritizes achieving a \u00abdecision advantage at machine speed,\u201d 35 French strategic culture tends to distance itself from purely quantitative positivism. As Beaumais and Ramel state, there exists an \u00abepistemological gap which generates uncertainty and doubts in French diplomats and soldiers compared to their allies and especially the United States.\u00bb 36 For the French intelligence community, the practice of intelligence has traditionally been oriented toward qualitative analysis and intellectual superiority. This is stated by its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs: \u00abour institutional culture orients our practices toward literary analysis, and even a demonstration of an intellectual superiority anchored in social science.\u201d 37. This French trait is not unique and resembles the strategic cultures of its European partners. This is precisely what explains why the contract with Palantir is so controversial: it is not merely a foreign dependency, but a fundamental clash with the ontology of the French intelligence community, which sees in data fusion algorithms a threat to the autonomy of human judgment 38 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet a paradox emerges, since France aims to build digital sovereignty by emulating the American model. Like the AIM Initiative, it accepts that innovation resides in the private sector and seeks to \u00abcarefully monitor and leverage private investment.\u00bb 39<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This phenomenon is described by F\u00e9lix Tr\u00e9guer as mimetic rivalry: even as French reformist discourses decry the hegemony of Big Tech, they do so while assuming the superiority of its models and disseminating its logic within public administration 40. France is seeking a French Palantir, for example, in models such as ChapsVision 41 . But French alternatives face the industrial fragmentation affecting the EDTIB. Following Bricet des Vallons, while the US system emerged from a strategic reform after 9\/11 that encouraged inter-agency cooperation 42 , in France the DGA (Directorate General of Armaments) exercises hyper-centralized control that often generates a \u00abforce d’inertie\u00bb 43 and technological developments that are \u00abhors sol\u00bb 44 disconnected from operational reality), as has happened with the chronic delays affecting the Artemis platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A final comparison is that while the AIM Initiative is a voluntary surge strategy in which the state orchestrates private technology 45 , the French situation is one of captive dependency: \u00abParis est captive de dix ans de d\u00e9pendance post-13- Novembre.\u201d46 In the US, where the defense market operates through an Iron Triangle model, integrating local contractors is part of how power projection is envisioned. In France, by contrast, a state in which defence companies must be linked to it, typically through equity ties 47 , an infrastructural assemblage of this kind with a foreign company is seen as a projection of vulnerability 48 . Sami Makki states that this is unprecedented in the Fifth Republic 49.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

35 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2019). The AIM Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines, p. 2<\/p>\n\n\n\n

36 Beaumais, L., & Ramel, F. (2025). French Disconnection: Armed Conflict Databases usages in Diplomacy and Defense. En Quantifying International Conflicts, Springer, p. 104.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

37 Ibid., p. 105.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

38 Rapport CHEMI. (2019). Encadrement des risques techniques et juridiques des activit\u00e9s de police pr\u00e9dictive, p. 164.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

39 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2019)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

40 Tr\u00e9guer, F. (2019). Seeing like Big Tech: Security assemblages and the reconfiguration of state power. En Data Politics, Routledge, p. 153.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

41 Data V-Lab. (2026, enero). ChapsVision : le nouveau g\u00e9ant fran\u00e7ais de la donn\u00e9e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

42 Bricet des Vallons, G.-H. (2019). Technologies de renseignement : \u00e0 la recherche d’un mod\u00e8le de d\u00e9veloppement pour la France. Revue D\u00e9fense Nationale, (825), p. 87.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

43 Ibid., p. 87.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

44 Ibid., p. 84.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

45 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2019). The AIM Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines, p. iv. Cita original: \u00abwe must carefully monitor and leverage private investment\u00bb<\/p>\n\n\n\n

46 Info.fr. (2026, 29 de abril). Berlin claque la porte \u00e0 Palantir : trois Europ\u00e9ens en lice pour le cloud militaire allemand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

47 Warusfel, B. (2021). Technologies et s\u00e9curit\u00e9 : r\u00e9guler pour reprendre le contr\u00f4le. Cahiers de la S\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de la Justice, (50), p. 259.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

48 Makki, S. (2025). Holding Corporations Accountable? Data age, warfare and the US leadership in AI for defence. En L. Beaumais et al. (Eds.), Quantifying International Conflicts, Springer, p. 247.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

49 Ibid., p. 247.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.2. The Innovation Fallacy: The DATAWAR Report and the Failure of Alternatives<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To understand why the DGSI persists in its assemblage with Palantir despite a decade of efforts to replace it, it is useful to draw on the concept of the innovation fallacy, identified within the DATAWAR initiative 50 . This notion, developed by Sami Makki, suggests that in defense environments there is a systemic risk of overestimating the impact of new and disruptive technologies based solely on informational campaigns from the industrial sector and lobbying 51. The core of this fallacy lies in ignoring a fundamental tenet of current technological geopolitics: \u00abdiffusion matters more than invention\u00bb 52. In the French context, the search for digital sovereignty has ended up trapped by this logic 53. While political discourse has centred on creating a purely national instrument, such as the OTDH or Artemis, dissemination capacity has been neglected. This is significant because Palantir does not merely offer software, but comprehensive diffusion throughout the intelligence apparatus. As noted in a report from the National Assembly, the required level of accuracy is such that \u00abil ne s’agit pas de laisser passer 20 % des donn\u00e9es.\u00bb 54 Therefore, a national alternative has no sovereign value if it cannot match the dissemination maturity of the installed tool 55.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, despite the political will for strategic autonomy, French initiatives reveal what DATAWAR analysts describe as a deep gap between ambition and industrial reality. As noted by Puyvelde and Oling: \u00abThe problem was not so much a lack of national capabilities but their dispersed nature, which points to communication flaws across the public-private divide.\u00bb 56<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the best-known alternatives has been Artemis.IA (Architecture de Traitement et d’Exploitation Massive de l’Information multi-Sources) 57. However, the development of Artemis has suffered from excessive control by the DGA. This institution is characterized by a model of vertical governance and hyper-centrality, itself a legacy of French statism58. This model carries a key limitation: it prioritizes the vision of the weapons engineer over that of the operational user. According to Bricet des Vallons, this disconnect has condemned the project to being a solution that is \u00abhors sol, [en raison de] la non-implication d’utilisateurs finaux comme la DGSI et la DGSE dans le projet.\u00bb 59 . As it was never integrated from the outset, the design of Artemis became a long-term theoretical exercise. Palantir, by contrast, has offered a trained model since 2016 60, while Artemis remained stuck in demonstration phases, with the maturity of its machine learning results not expected for another 15 years 61 . Bureaucracy is thus incompatible with the accelerated pace of the AI era, in which speed is not merely a variable but a structural constraint. At the same time, state centralism has fostered a fragmented national ecosystem, in which, instead of a unified strategy, French services have operated in silos 62: the DGA piloted Artemis for the armed forces, while the DGSI independently pursued its own solution (OTDH). The DGA piloted Artemis for the Armed Forces, while the DGSI independently sought its own solution (OTDH) 63. This<\/p>\n\n\n\n

50 Makki, S. (2025). Holding Corporations Accountable? Data age, warfare and the US leadership in AI for defence. En L. Beaumais et al. (Eds.), Quantifying International Conflicts, Springer, p. 233.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

51 Ibid., p. 233.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

52 Ding, J. (2024), citado en Makki, S. (2025), op. cit., p. 264.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

53 Tr\u00e9guer, F. (2019). Seeing like Big Tech: Security assemblages and the reconfiguration of state power. En Data Politics, Routledge, p. 153.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

54 Assembl\u00e9e Nationale. (2026). Compte rendu de r\u00e9union n\u00b0 24 – Commission d’enqu\u00eate sur les d\u00e9pendances structurelles, p. 11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

55 OpexNews. (2025, 15 de diciembre). La DGSI renouvelle son contrat avec Palantir pour trois ans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

56 Puyvelde, D. V., & Oling, P. (2025). Public-private collaboration and the digital transformation of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 40(6), p. 1022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

57 Direction G\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019Armement. (2022). Lancement de la r\u00e9alisation du projet Artemis.IA. Citado en Beaumais, L. (2025), p. 131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

58 Bricet des Vallons, G.-H. (2019). Technologies de renseignement : \u00e0 la recherche d’un mod\u00e8le de d\u00e9veloppement pour la France. Revue D\u00e9fense Nationale, (825), p. 87.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

59 Ibid., p. 84.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

60 OTDH, Outil de Traitement des Donn\u00e9es H\u00e9t\u00e9rog\u00e8nes install\u00e9 en 2016. Ver OpexNews (2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

61 Bricet des Vallons, G.-H. (2019). op. cit., p. 84.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

62 Ibid. p. 87.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

63 Puyvelde, D. V., & Oling, P. (2025). op. cit., p. 1018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

lack of technical mutualization prevented France from generating a critical mass of technological capital capable of rivaling Palantir 64 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But if Palantir represents the failure of centralized French bureaucracy, ChapsVision represents a different option, one that aims to build digital sovereignty through market aggregation. The aim of ChapsVision, led by entrepreneur Olivier Dellenbach, is for France to achieve digital sovereignty not through a single national investment, but through the repurposing of several already-existing capabilities. Under this logic, the company has acquired 29 companies in less than six years, integrating specialists in CRM, marketing automation, and, crucially, strategic pillars for security such as Sinequa (cognitive search and AI) and Iremos (crisis management). This division is called CyberGov and seeks to articulate a unified demand for defense and intelligence. As stated in an analysis from Data V Lab: \u00abEn six ans, une entreprise fran\u00e7aise est pass\u00e9e de z\u00e9ro \u00e0 29 acquisitions. Son objectif ? D\u00e9loger Palantir de son tr\u00f4ne europ\u00e9en et incarner enfin cette fameuse souverainet\u00e9 num\u00e9rique.\u00bb 65 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The operational relevance of ChapVision depends on its capacity to transform a catalog of disparate tools into a coherent whole. The ArgonOS operating system has been designed to serve as the unification layer that must digest the software infrastructure so that its components can communicate fluidly with one another. Despite this, the gap between commercial ambition and technical reality remains the company’s main challenge, as the risk persists of becoming an \u00abassemblage d’outils juxtapos\u00e9s sous une m\u00eame banni\u00e8re.\u00bb For these reasons, the DGSI remains cautious about its capacity to scale in critical environments 66 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. Challenges for Digital Sovereignty and Accountability<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The assemblage between the DGSI and Palantir raises several questions regarding national authority and accountability in the era of algorithmic predominance. Beyond operational effectiveness, a tension can be identified between formal sovereignty (legal framework \u2013 potestas) and functional sovereignty (technical framework \u2013 auctoritas).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The DGSI has always maintained that it retains legal ownership of the data. This data is indeed stored on physical servers in France and can only be accessed by authorized personnel 67 . But these arguments overlook the fact that true power does not lie in the storage layer, but in the orchestration layer 68 . As orchestration is delegated to Gotham, it is Palantir that structures the conditions of decision-making 69 . This imposes a certain vision of the world upon the intelligence agency, defining how connections are interpreted 70.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is precisely linked to what is known as the Problem of Many Hands: as several types of actors are involved in the process of transforming inputs into outputs, responsibility for these actions becomes diffuse and difficult to trace. This can be serious, for example, when targeting decisions are mistaken. This is further aggravated by two distinct layers of opacity. On the one hand, there is a form of state opacity stemming from the secrecy surrounding the DGSI. On the other hand, there is a form of corporate opacity, since one of the drawbacks of machine learning is that, in many cases, not even Palantir’s own operators can reconstruct the process. Indeed, according to the CNCTR report, the imbalance between the mass of data processed and the limited resources available continues to grow 71. This leads to \u201cd\u00e9responsabilisation\u201d: \u201cthe accent is on the board of the decision, the SIA is never neutral\u201d 72. This challenge will remain highly relevant in the coming decades, with or without Palantir. However, a fully national process would make it easier to establish common legal frameworks and simplify the distribution of responsibilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

64 Bricet des Vallons, G.-H. (2019). op. cit., p. 87.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

65 Data V-Lab. (2026, enero). ChapsVision : le nouveau g\u00e9ant fran\u00e7ais de la donn\u00e9e. El informe describe la estrategia de crecimiento inorg\u00e1nico de la empresa para construir un campe\u00f3n de la soberan\u00eda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

66 Solutions Num\u00e9riques. (2025, 15 de diciembre). La DGSI reconduit Palantir : quand la souverainet\u00e9 technologique reste un objectif diff\u00e9r\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

67 Boursorama avec Media Services. (2025, 15 de diciembre). Renseignement int\u00e9rieur: la DGSI renouvelle son contrat avec l’entreprise am\u00e9ricaine Palantir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

68 Le Picard, S. (2026). R\u00e9volution num\u00e9rique, chambardement \u00e9conomique. Politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re, (1), p. 51.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

69 Nato Defense College Foundation. (s.f.). Palantir and the Alchemy of Hybrid Power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

70 Assembl\u00e9e Nationale. (2026). Compte rendu de r\u00e9union n\u00b0 24 – Commission d’enqu\u00eate sur les d\u00e9pendances structurelles, p. 10.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

71 Commission nationale de contr\u00f4le des techniques de renseignement (CNCTR). (2023). Rapport d’activit\u00e9 2023, p. 172. Ver tambi\u00e9n Warusfel, B. (2021). Technologies et s\u00e9curit\u00e9, p. 259.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

72 CNCTR. (2023). op. cit., p.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question with which this dissertation begins \u201cWhy does cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?\u201d cannot be answered from a single point of view, and requires a methodological perspective drawing on sociological, technical, and doctrinal analysis. What this case reveals is that the persistence of this relationship is not due to a lack of political will, but rather to the uncertainty experienced in the international arena and within France itself, which has encouraged a complete integration of Palantir into French intelligence processes, making it difficult to replace. Other factors must also be taken into account, shared by the DGSI and other intelligence communities alike, chief among them a reconfiguration of the intelligence field, in which the state is compelled to establish a network of actors and in which new technologies play a critical role. Since power lies in the capacity to respond to uncertainty, if France were to remove Palantir\/Gotham from the equation, it would face a strategic blindness that would leave it vulnerable to its rivals and to emerging threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, examining the relationship established through the contract renewal with Palantir as an assemblage reveals that what is at stake is not merely software, but the entire cognitive capacity of the French state. FDEs cannot be seen simply as external technicians; rather, they are an intrinsic component enabling co-production, embedding their own logic regarding the algorithm’s use into the backbone of French intelligence. This implies that DGSI analysts have learned to see threats through the models preestablished by Palantir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that national alternatives, namely Artemis and ChapsVision, have thus far failed is itself a manifestation of the innovation fallacy. This reflects an overestimation of the value of a sovereign solution, without due consideration of the importance of machine learning model maturity and the diffusion of software throughout the intelligence apparatus. ChapsVision appears to be the most feasible alternative, but its viability in the operational environment remains to be seen. For this reason, France has, for now, hesitated to commit fully to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The relevance of this delegation of sovereignty has become evident in the doctrinal comparison with the AIM Initiative. The comparison also reveals, however, that France aspires to digital autonomy while mimetically reproducing the very model it seeks to overcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Likewise, this dissertation leaves open a line of future research worth exploring: whether this phenomenon is experienced in the same way among all of France’s NATO allies. One can observe, for example, that in some non- academic media there has been a tendency to compare France with Germany, both states that seek to build strategic autonomy and that, in the face of uncertainty, are making heavy investments in the defense techno-industrial base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bibliography:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arboit, G. (2024). Les mutations du renseignement au XXIe si\u00e8cle. Diplomatie, (130), 60-64.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assembl\u00e9e Nationale. (2026). Compte rendu de r\u00e9union n\u00b0 24 – Commission d’enqu\u00eate sur les d\u00e9pendances structurelles et les vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s syst\u00e9miques dans le secteur du num\u00e9rique et les risques pour l’ind\u00e9pendance de la France. Session 2025\u20132026, Par\u00eds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beaumais, L., Lindemann, T., Ramel, F., Lambert, I., Makki, S., & Sangar, E. (Eds.). (2025). Quantifying International Conflicts: Armed Conflict Databases, Practices and Representations of War. Palgrave Macmillan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Biddle, S. (2017, 22 de febrero). How Peter Thiel\u2019s Palantir helped the NSA spy on the whole world. The Intercept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Boursorama avec Media Services. (2025, 15 de diciembre). Renseignement int\u00e9rieur: la DGSI renouvelle son contrat avec l’entreprise am\u00e9ricaine Palantir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bricet des Vallons, G.-H. (2019). Technologies de renseignement : \u00e0 la recherche d’un mod\u00e8le de d\u00e9veloppement pour la France. Revue D\u00e9fense Nationale, (825), 83-89.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cairn.info. (s.f.). Souverainet\u00e9 num\u00e9rique : quelles strat\u00e9gies pour la France et l\u2019Europe ?.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Castets-Renard, C., Besse, P., Loubes, J.-M., & Perrussel, L. (2019). Encadrement des risques techniques et juridiques des activit\u00e9s de police pr\u00e9dictive. Rapport de recherche, Centre des Hautes Etudes du Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Int\u00e9rieur (CHEMI).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ceyhan, A. A. (2026). Big Data & AI for Intelligence: Dynamics that structure intelligence in the AI Era (Session 12). Sciences Po.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ChapsVision. (2025, enero). Acquisition d’Iremos : solutions souveraines pour secteurs r\u00e9galiens. Communiqu\u00e9 de presse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Commission nationale de contr\u00f4le des techniques de renseignement (CNCTR). (2023). Rapport d’activit\u00e9 2023. Par\u00eds: CNCTR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Data V-Lab. (2026, enero). ChapsVision : le nouveau g\u00e9ant fran\u00e7ais de la donn\u00e9e. Dossier d’analyse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Decarolis, F., Torchia, L., & Marchetti, B. (Eds.). (2025). The EU Digital Regulation and its Impact on Member States. Springer Nature Switzerland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Decideo. (2026). Big data et s\u00e9curit\u00e9 int\u00e9rieure : l’\u00e9diteur fran\u00e7ais Blueway, toujours au 1er rang pour remplacer l’am\u00e9ricain Palantir, aupr\u00e8s de la DGSI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Direction G\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019Armement. (2022). Lancement de la r\u00e9alisation du projet Artemis.IA. Communiqu\u00e9 de presse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Eddazi, F. (2018). L\u2019association du secteur priv\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019exploitation des donn\u00e9es polici\u00e8res. Revue du Droit Public, (1), 189-205.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

France Defense. (2022). France approves final phase of Artemis Big Data Processing platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Franceinfo. (2024). Quatre choses \u00e0 savoir sur Palantir, ce g\u00e9ant technologique am\u00e9ricain controvers\u00e9 qui travaille avec la DGSI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gautron, V. (2019). Surveiller, sanctionner et pr\u00e9dire les risques : les secrets imp\u00e9n\u00e9trables du fichage policier. Champ p\u00e9nal\/Penal field, (16).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hoffmann, S., Chalati, N., & Dogan, A. (2022). Rethinking intelligence practices and processes: three sociological concepts for the study of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 1-25.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iliadis, A., & Acker, A. (2022). The seer and the seen: Surveying Palantir\u2019s surveillance platform. The Information Society, 38(5), 334-363.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Info.fr. (2026, 29 de abril). Berlin claque la porte \u00e0 Palantir : trois Europ\u00e9ens en lice pour le cloud militaire allemand – Le paradoxe franco-allemand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Intelligence Community News. (2025, diciembre). Palantir renews DGSI contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

King, A. (2024). Digital Targeting: Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Military Intelligence. Journal of Global Security Studies, 9(2), ogae009.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le Picard, S. (2026). R\u00e9volution num\u00e9rique, chambardement \u00e9conomique. Politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re, (1), 45-56.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lim, K. (2016). Big Data and Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 31(4), 619-635.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mahr, D. (2025). The politics of Project Maven: AI and accountability. ITAS, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Middle East Eye. (2024). Israel used Palantir technology in its 2024 Lebanon pager attack, book claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nato Defense College Foundation. (2026, 10 de abril). Prediction Markets as the New Hegemony of Intelligence. Spagnuolo, G..<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obendiek, A. S. (2025). Private Companies in Digital Security: How Private Control over Information and Knowledge Shapes Regulatory Challenges. Journal of Global Security Studies, ogaf016.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Observatoire de la souverainet\u00e9 num\u00e9rique. (2026, 27 de enero). Communiqu\u00e9 de presse : Lancement de l’Observatoire de la souverainet\u00e9 num\u00e9rique. Par\u00eds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2019). The AIM Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines. Washington, DC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

OpexNews. (2025, 15 de diciembre). La DGSI renouvelle son contrat avec Palantir pour trois ans – OTDH, la colonne vert\u00e9brale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Privacy International. (2020). All roads lead to Palantir: A review of how the data analytics company has embedded itself throughout the UK. Londres.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Puyvelde, D. V., & Oling, P. (2025). Public-private collaboration and the digital transformation of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 40(6), 1015-1030.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Renault, J. (2022). Renseigner autrement: trajectoires de l’OSINT dans les services de renseignement. H\u00e9rodote, (186), 19-35.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sadowski, J. (2019). When Data Is Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction. Big Data & Society, 6(1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Salon. (2024). When the government can see everything: How one company is mapping the nation’s data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Solutions Num\u00e9riques. (2025, 15 de diciembre). La DGSI reconduit Palantir : quand la souverainet\u00e9 technologique reste un objectif diff\u00e9r\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Spagnuolo, G. (2026). Palantir and the Alchemy of Hybrid Power. Nato Defense College Foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Synth Media. (2025, 14 de diciembre). La DGSI reconduit Palantir : chronique d’une d\u00e9pendance assum\u00e9e en pleine tension transatlantique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tr\u00e9guer, F. (2019). Seeing like Big Tech: Security assemblages and the reconfiguration of state power. En D. Bigo, E. Isin & E. Ruppert (Eds.), Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights. Routledge, 132-164.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tr\u00e9guer, F., & No\u00fbs, C. (2019). Les chercheurs face \u00e0 la surveillance d\u2019\u00c9tat : \u00e9tat des lieux et contre-mesures. Trac\u00e9s. Revue de Sciences humaines, (#19), 129-144.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

VIPress.net. (2022, 11 de julio). La D\u00e9fense se met \u00e0 l’heure du Big Data et de l’IA avec le lancement d’un proyecto conduit par Thales et Atos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Warusfel, B. (2021). Intelligence et droit \u00e0 l’\u00e8re de l’intelligence artificielle. Cahiers de la S\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de la Justice, (50), 257-268.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

W\u00f6rsd\u00f6rfer, M. (2025). The Trump Administration’s AI and Tech Policy: A Comparative Ethical Analysis. SSRN Electronic Journal<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Jan Gallem\u00ed Alb\u00e1s\u00a0es estudiante del M\u00e1ster en Seguridad Internacional en Sciences Po, en Par\u00eds, donde se especializa en inteligencia y riesgos globales.Actualmente combina su formaci\u00f3n acad\u00e9mica con su labor como Young European Ambassador y su colaboraci\u00f3n con centros de an\u00e1lisis como Global Affairs and Strategic Studies y el Centro de Pensamiento Naval, centrando su trabajo […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1671,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"saved_in_kubio":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,26,17,20,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1669","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articulos","category-ciberseguridad","category-geopolitica-y-geoestrategia","category-inteligencia","category-tecnologia"],"yoast_head":"\nWhy does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy? - Inteligenia<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"es_ES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy? - Inteligenia\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Jan Gallem\u00ed Alb\u00e1s\u00a0es estudiante del M\u00e1ster en Seguridad Internacional en Sciences Po, en Par\u00eds, donde se especializa en inteligencia y riesgos globales.Actualmente combina su formaci\u00f3n acad\u00e9mica con su labor como Young European Ambassador y su colaboraci\u00f3n con centros de an\u00e1lisis como Global Affairs and Strategic Studies y el Centro de Pensamiento Naval, centrando su trabajo […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Inteligenia\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-09-09T09:11:44+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-09-09T09:11:46+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1672\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"941\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@INTELIGENIA_\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@INTELIGENIA_\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Escrito por\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Tiempo de lectura\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"32 minutos\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/person\/1bf90ee63c207f611a224f9c17dbf031\"},\"headline\":\"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-09-09T09:11:44+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-09-09T09:11:46+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\"},\"wordCount\":6817,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png\",\"articleSection\":[\"Art\u00edculos\",\"Ciberseguridad\",\"Geopolitica y Geoestrategia\",\"Inteligencia\",\"Tecnolog\u00eda\"],\"inLanguage\":\"es\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\",\"name\":\"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy? - Inteligenia\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-09-09T09:11:44+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-09-09T09:11:46+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"es\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"es\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png\",\"width\":1672,\"height\":941},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Portada\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/\",\"name\":\"Inteligenia\",\"description\":\"\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"es\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Inteligenia\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"es\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/transparent_logo-1-e1718047668142.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/transparent_logo-1-e1718047668142.png\",\"width\":674,\"height\":141,\"caption\":\"Inteligenia\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/x.com\/INTELIGENIA_\",\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/inteligenia\/?viewAsMember=true\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/person\/1bf90ee63c207f611a224f9c17dbf031\",\"name\":\"admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"es\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed712be762908ac190eb3beb8cf9efb0dc9c425bd7b69d40ba8746efca2909c6?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed712be762908ac190eb3beb8cf9efb0dc9c425bd7b69d40ba8746efca2909c6?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"http:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/author\/admin\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy? - Inteligenia","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/","og_locale":"es_ES","og_type":"article","og_title":"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy? - Inteligenia","og_description":"Jan Gallem\u00ed Alb\u00e1s\u00a0es estudiante del M\u00e1ster en Seguridad Internacional en Sciences Po, en Par\u00eds, donde se especializa en inteligencia y riesgos globales.Actualmente combina su formaci\u00f3n acad\u00e9mica con su labor como Young European Ambassador y su colaboraci\u00f3n con centros de an\u00e1lisis como Global Affairs and Strategic Studies y el Centro de Pensamiento Naval, centrando su trabajo […]","og_url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/","og_site_name":"Inteligenia","article_published_time":"2026-09-09T09:11:44+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-09-09T09:11:46+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1672,"height":941,"url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@INTELIGENIA_","twitter_site":"@INTELIGENIA_","twitter_misc":{"Escrito por":"admin","Tiempo de lectura":"32 minutos"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/"},"author":{"name":"admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/person\/1bf90ee63c207f611a224f9c17dbf031"},"headline":"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?","datePublished":"2026-09-09T09:11:44+00:00","dateModified":"2026-09-09T09:11:46+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/"},"wordCount":6817,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png","articleSection":["Art\u00edculos","Ciberseguridad","Geopolitica y Geoestrategia","Inteligencia","Tecnolog\u00eda"],"inLanguage":"es","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/","url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/","name":"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy? - Inteligenia","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png","datePublished":"2026-09-09T09:11:44+00:00","dateModified":"2026-09-09T09:11:46+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"es","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"es","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/ChatGPT-Image-9-sept-2026-11_08_30.png","width":1672,"height":941},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/why-does-the-cooperation-between-the-dgsi-and-palantir-persist-despite-ongoing-controversy\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Portada","item":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Why does the cooperation between the DGSI and Palantir persist despite ongoing controversy?"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/","name":"Inteligenia","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"es"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#organization","name":"Inteligenia","url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"es","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/transparent_logo-1-e1718047668142.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/transparent_logo-1-e1718047668142.png","width":674,"height":141,"caption":"Inteligenia"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/x.com\/INTELIGENIA_","https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/inteligenia\/?viewAsMember=true"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/person\/1bf90ee63c207f611a224f9c17dbf031","name":"admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"es","@id":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed712be762908ac190eb3beb8cf9efb0dc9c425bd7b69d40ba8746efca2909c6?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed712be762908ac190eb3beb8cf9efb0dc9c425bd7b69d40ba8746efca2909c6?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"admin"},"sameAs":["http:\/\/www.inteligenia.info"],"url":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/author\/admin\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1669","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1669"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1669\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1672,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1669\/revisions\/1672"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1671"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1669"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1669"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1669"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}