{"id":1686,"date":"2026-09-17T07:38:13","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T07:38:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/?p=1686"},"modified":"2026-09-17T07:38:14","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T07:38:14","slug":"europe-under-pressure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.inteligenia.info\/home\/europe-under-pressure\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe under pressure"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Andres Saura<\/strong>. Logistics and finance professional currently working at NATO Joint Force Command Brunssum, with experience in military logistics, budget execution and financial administration. Bachelor’s graduate in Logistics Management and currently completing a Master’s in International and Geopolitical Analysis. Experienced with NATO environments, LOGFAS, Oracle FinS, Excel and Power BI, with a growing portfolio of published research on European security, defence, strategic autonomy, hybrid threats and emerging military technologies.\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Contents<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1.      Introduction: Sabotage, drones and electronic interference are forcing NATO to connect events that, when examined separately, might appear to be unrelated anomalies. 3<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.      A succession of Strategic Targets. 5<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.      The drone industry as a new target 6<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

4.      The Baltic\u2019s invisible front 8<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

6.      Connecting the dots without forcing the conclusion. 10<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

7.      From military protection to societal resilience. 11<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

8.      References. 13<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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1.     Introduction: Sabotage, drones and electronic interference are forcing NATO to connect events that, when examined separately, might appear to be unrelated anomalies<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

In early September 2026, NATO\u2019s Allied Force Command Brunssum (one of the Alliance\u2019s three operational-level headquarters) published an unusually direct message. It listed several recent incidents across Europe: explosives discovered at a German power substation, suspicious drone activity at Leipzig\/Halle airport, a foiled arson attempt against a drone factory in Slovakia, a fire at a Polish facility producing drone components, recurring electronic inference in the Baltic Region and repeated violations of NATO airspace (1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The message did not explicitly attribute all these events to the same actor. Nevertheless, it raised a question that is becoming increasingly important in European capitals: are these still isolated incidents or are they part of a broader campaign intended to disrupt critical infrastructure, undermine support for Ukraine and test NATO\u2019s ability to respond?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Answering this question requires a careful distinction between confirmed facts, reasonable suspicions and formal state attribution. This distinction is particularly important because ambiguity is not merely a side effect of hybrid warfare, it is one of its principal tools.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Figure 1. Geographic distribution of Russian attacks and plots in Europe, 2022\u20132025, classified by target type. Source: CSIS analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The geographical distribution of these incidents shows that the phenomenon is not confined to NATO\u2019s eastern border. Although the Baltic region and Poland remain particularly exposed, operations have also affected Western and Central European countries involved in supporting Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.     A succession of Strategic Targets<\/a><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

One of the most serious incidents occurred at Leipzig\/Halle Airport. On 4 August 2026, an explosive laden drone was discovered close to a Ukrainian aircraft. The device was defused before it could cause casualties or significant damage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Leipzig\/Halle is not an ordinary airport. It is one of Europe\u2019s main airfreight hubs and supports activities connected with the Strategic Airlift International Solution, or SALIS, which transports equipment for NATO missions and reinforces the Alliance\u2019s eastern flank. Ukrainian Antonov transport aircraft also operate regularly from the airport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The airport had already been targeted in 2024, when an incendiary device ignited at a logistics center and set fire to a freight container before it could be loaded onto an aircraft. Western security officials subsequently suspected that Russian intelligence had organised the operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In September 2026 the German government went further and formally attributed the August drone attack to Russia. Interior minister Alexander Dobrindt stated that the configuration of the drones, their components, the explosives and the detonator matched elements observed in previous Russian hybrid operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Berlin, the available police and intelligence findings indicated that the participants had acted on behalf of Russian state entities, although the physical execution of the operation appeared to have been entrusted to low-level agents. Moscow rejected the accusation and argued that Germany had failed to provide convincing evidence (2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Almost simultaneously, German authorities began investigating two deliberate attacks against the country\u2019s electricity infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At a substation near the J\u00e4nschwalde power plant in Brandenburg, investigators discovered more than a dozen rocket-like devices fitted with propellant charges. These devices appear to have been designed to lift conductive cables into high-voltage power lines. One succeeded in creating an electrical connection to the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hours later, another incident disrupted the Bergheim substation near Cologne. Investigators found six launching devices in a nearby field and concluded that conductive material had deliberately been placed over the power lines. Five coal-fired generating units, with a combined capacity of approximately 4,200 megawatts, were temporarily taken offline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

German authorities have confirmed that the incidents were deliberate, but they have not publicly identified the perpetrators or demonstrated that the two attacks were connected. Investigators are considering several possibilities, including an operation directed by a foreign state and an attack by domestic left-wing extremists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The methodology is compatible with hybrid sabotage, but this alone is insufficient to attribute the incidents to Russia (3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.     The drone industry as a new target<\/a><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The attacks have not been limited to Germany. In August 2026, Slovak police disrupted a suspected plot to set fire to a drone production facility in eastern Slovakia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the authorities initially avoided identifying the company, the available details corresponded with Skyeton, a Ukrainian-founded manufacturer operating near Pre\u0161ov. The company produces advanced reconnaissance drones and had reportedly moved part of its production to Slovakia to protect it from direct Russian attacks against Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three foreign nationals were arrested. Two were detained in Slovakia, while the third was apprehended in Germany under a European arrest warrant. Slovak authorities charged them with preparing the particularly serious crime of \u201cgeneral endangerment.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The available reporting suggested that the suspects intended to use highly flammable materials to create a major fire. However, the Slovak authorities had not, at the time of writing, issued a definitive public attribution to the Russian state. A Russian connection remained an investigative hypothesis rather than an established judicial conclusion (4).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Polish case provides stronger evidence regarding the deliberate nature of the attack. On 31 August, a fire damaged a WB Electronics facility in Skar\u017cysko-Kamienna. WB Electronics is Poland\u2019s largest privately owned defence company and manufactures unmanned systems used by both the Polish and Ukrainian armed forces, including the FlyEye reconnaissance drone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Polish prosecutors concluded that the fire had been deliberately started using an explosive device containing flammable materials. CCTV footage reportedly showed an unidentified masked person entering the premises after climbing over a fence. A backpack and sweatshirt were later recovered near the site.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The attack destroyed warehouse facilities and caused damage initially estimated at no less than 15 million Polish zlotys. Prosecutors opened an investigation into both a terrorist offence and possible participation in the activities of a foreign intelligence service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, at the time of writing, no individual had been publicly charged, and the Polish authorities had not issued a definitive attribution to Russia (5).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The selection of targets is significant. Leipzig\/Halle connects Europe\u2019s logistical rear area with Ukraine. WB Electronics and Skyeton form part of the expanding European and Ukrainian drone-production ecosystem. The German substations support the functioning of the economy and essential public services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These are not conventional military targets. They are civilian, logistical, energy and industrial nodes whose disruption can nevertheless generate strategic consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Figure 2. Primary targets of Russian attacks and plots in Europe between January 2022 and March 2025. Source: CSIS analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

CSIS data reinforces this assessment. Transportation and government-related targets each accounted for approximately 27 per cent of the incidents included in its database, while critical infrastructure and industrial facilities represented a further 21 per cent each. The figures demonstrate that civilian systems supporting military and economic activity have become central targets of sub-threshold operations.
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4.     The Baltic\u2019s invisible front<\/a><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

This succession of sabotage incidents has been accompanied by a less visible but increasingly disruptive form of pressure: interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the beginning of Russia\u2019s full scale in Ukraine, several Northern European countries have reported a substantial rise in both jamming and spoofing. Jamming blocks or degrades satellite-navigation signals, while spoofing transmits false information that causes a receiver to calculate an incorrect position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In May 2026, Lithuania\u2019s telecommunications regulator reported that GPS falsification originating in Russia could reach approximately 450 km. According to its assessment, the interference could affect Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, most of Poland and parts of Finland, Sweden and the Baltic Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Figure 3. Estimated geographic reach of GNSS interference originating from Russia\u2019s Kaliningrad region. Author\u2019s elaboration based on Lithuanian regulatory data reported by Reuters (6). The represented area indicates the estimated potential reach of the interference and should not be interpreted as uniform or permanently active coverage.<\/em> The consequences extend beyond military operations. Interference can affect civilian aviation, commercial shipping, drones, mobile communications and public services that rely on accurate positioning and timing information.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s electronic warfare activity may have an immediate defensive purpose: protecting Kaliningrad and other sensitive installations from Ukrainian long-range drones. However, its effects reach well beyond Russian territory and generate risks for civilian navigations inside NATO member states (6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electronic interference also complicates the interpretation of airspace violations. Some Ukrainian drones have entered NATO airspace after apparently deviating from their intended routes, potentially because of Russian jamming or spoofing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This distinction matters. A deliberate Russian incursion, a Ukrainian drone diverted by electronic warfare and a technical navigation error may produce similar image on a radar screen, but their political and military implications are fundamentally different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n